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1 Introduction
One of the key tenets of Marxian economics is the idea that exploitation and
class are defining features of capitalist economies. This raises two issues.
First, the existence of a logically coherent and empirically meaningful defi-
nition of exploitation and class. Second, the economic mechanisms that lead
to the emergence and persistence of exploitation and class.
The first issue has received a lot of attention in the literature, leading to
vast debates on the notions of exploitation and class. The received view is
that no logically consistent and empirically meaningful definition exists which
captures the key positive and normative insights of the Marxian theory of ex-
ploitation and class in general economies. This view has been questioned in a
series of recent papers by Yoshihara and Veneziani (e.g. [26, 27, 19]). In these
contributions, the concept of exploitation is analysed using a novel, general
axiomatic approach which allows one to rigorously capture the normative
and positive foundations of exploitation theory. Contrary to the received
wisdom, it is shown that there exists a nonempty class of logically consis-
tent definitions - conceptually related to the so-called “New Interpretation”
(Dume´nil [5]; Foley [8]; Dume´nil, Foley, and Le´vy [6]; see also Mohun [11])
- that satisfy a set of desirable properties in general convex economies with
heterogeneous agents - including the existence of a robust relation between
profits and exploitation, as well as between class and exploitation.
These contributions, however, focus on one-period economies with no
savings and accumulation, and have relatively little to say about the second
issue in the opening paragraph, namely the dynamics of class, exploitation,
and profits. This is not a minor issue. In his seminal theory, Roemer [14] has
proved that exploitation and classes emerge as the equilibrium outcome of
differential ownership of the means of production in competitive economies
with optimising agents when capital is scarce, leading him to conclude that
the normative relevance of exploitation reduces to an exclusive emphasis on
asset inequalities.
Yet Roemer’s results have been derived in one-period models whereas cap-
italism, according to Marx, is an inherently dynamic system geared towards
capital accumulation and so one may argue that class and exploitation should
be analysed in a dynamic framework. In dynamic accumulation economies,
it is not difficult to show that capital may become abundant, leading profits
and exploitation to disappear (Devine and Dymski [4]). Perhaps more sur-
prisingly, Veneziani [17, 18] and Veneziani and Yoshihara [20] have proved
that if savings are allowed in a dynamic capitalist economy, then asset in-
equalities are necessary for exploitation to emerge, but alone they are not
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sufficient for it to persist even if agents do not accumulate in equilibrium.
These results cast doubts on the claim that asset inequalities are necessary
and sufficient for the emergence and the persistence of exploitative relations,
and raise the issue of the determinants of exploitation and class.
This paper adopts the conceptual approach to exploitation proposed by
Yoshihara and Veneziani ([26, 27, 19]) in order to study the dynamics of
asset inequalities, exploitation and classes. We significantly generalise Roe-
mer’s [13, 14] accumulation economies with maximising agents in order to
incorporate nonstationary prices, population growth, time-varying consump-
tion norms, technical change, and distributive conflict. We analyse - both
formally and computationally - the dynamic equilibrium trajectories of the
economies and their class and exploitation structures, and generalise some
fundamental insights originally proved by Roemer [14], including the so-called
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (henceforth, CECP).
To be specific, we consider three main models exploring different mecha-
nisms determining the emergence and persistence of exploitation and class.
We start off by analysing a basic economy with constant consumption, pop-
ulation, and technology: this benchmark scenario confirms the insights of
the previous literature by showing that accumulation leads exploitation to
disappear because the economy eventually becomes labour constrained.
We then extend the model to consider capitalists’ decisions to innovate
and norm-based consumption dynamics. Empirically, the long-run evolution
of capitalist economies has indeed been characterised by an increase in (av-
erage) consumption opportunities and by a tendential expansion of technical
knowledge, leading to a progressive increase in labour productivity (Flaschel
et al. [7]). Theoretically, our analysis confirms that labour-saving technical
progress may play a crucial role in making exploitation persistent by guar-
anteeing the persistent abundance of labour (Skillman [15]). In other words,
the capitalists’ control of investment and innovation decisions can make ex-
ploitation persistent by maintaining labour unemployment over time.
Although many actual capitalist economies have indeed gone through
long spells of labour unemployment, one may argue with Roemer [14] that
a general theory of exploitation and classes should not crucially depend -
either positively or normatively - on structural imbalances in factor markets.
Exploitation and class are characteristics of capitalist relations of production
and full employment does not make capitalist economies non-exploitative.
Therefore we analyse an extension of the basic model with population growth,
technical change and accumulation in which full employment occurs in every
period and distribution is determined using a general Nash bargaining pro-
cedure with the bargaining power of each agent endogenously determined as
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a function of their ownership of the means of production and class solidarity.
The results are quite striking: technical change and population growth are
not sufficient to make exploitation persistent unless capitalists are sufficiently
powerful and class solidarity among propertyless workers is sufficiently weak
even if the economy never becomes labour constrained. Capitalist power is an
essential determinant of the persistence of exploitation and class.
In all economies, we analyse the evolution of the structure of exploita-
tive relations. By deriving a robust correspondence between class and ex-
ploitation status, the CECP yields relevant normative insights on capitalist
economies. Yet, the CECP draws a rather partial, coarse picture of the
structure of exploitative relations: two economies with similar numbers of
agents belonging to each class and each exploitation category may still be
very different. Based on [26, 27, 19], we propose a novel index of the level,
or intensity of exploitation for individual agents, whose distribution provides
a finer and more comprehensive picture of exploitative relations. The anal-
ysis of its distribution yields relevant normative insights, and it raises some
interesting issues that are conceptually analogous to those discussed in the
literature on the measurement of income inequality.
Another contribution of the paper is methodological. Given the com-
plexity of the economies considered, the paper adopts a novel computational
approach to Marxian exploitation theory. Pioneering work applying compu-
tational methods to Marxian theory includes Wright [23, 24, 25], Cogliano
[2], and Cogliano and Jiang [3]. But the latter contributions focus on Marx-
ian price and value theory and the circuit of capital rather than exploitation
and class. More related to our work is an unpublished paper by Takamasu
[16], which adopts a computational approach to study class formation in ac-
cumulation economies. Yet this paper does not analyse exploitation and it
only considers a very basic scenario with constant technology, population and
consumption. Moreover, there is no explicit analysis of agents’ maximising
decisions or of the equilibrium conditions.
By moving beyond the straightjacket of analytical solutions, a computa-
tional approach allows us to study the equilibrium determination of exploita-
tion status and the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle, and trace
the co-evolution of exploitation and class over time in complex economies
with endogenous technical change, population growth, norm–based consump-
tion dynamics, and generalised N -agent bargaining. The results obtained are
robust with respect to changes in the specification of technology, population,
preferences and, especially, endowments, but also to alternative specifications
of some of the behavioural assumptions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The general framework
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is described in section 2. Section 3 analyses the benchmark economy with
stationary technology, population and consumption. Section 4 derives some
key theoretical results concerning class and exploitation in the basic model.
Section 5 presents the index capturing the level of exploitation of each agent.
Section 6 analyses the dynamics of the basic model, and its exploitation
and class structures, using computational techniques. Section 7 extends the
analysis to economies with endogenous consumption and technical change,
whereas section 8 focuses on the role of bargaining and power in economies
with full employment, technical change and population growth. Section 9
discusses the robustness of the results. Section 10 concludes.
2 The framework
Consider a dynamic extension of Roemer’s [14] accumulating economy with a
labour market and only one good produced and consumed.1 In every period
t = 1, 2, . . ., let Nt denote the set of agents with cardinality Nt and generic
element ν. At the beginning of each production period t, there is a finite set,
Pt, of Leontief production techniques (At, Lt), where 0 < At < 1 and Lt > 0,
and all agents have access to the techniques in Pt.
In every period t, agents have identical preferences but possess potentially
different endowments of labour, lνt−1, and capital, ω
ν
t−1, inherited from previ-
ous periods. The distribution of endowments at the beginning of t is given
by Πt−1 =
(
lνt−1
)
ν∈Nt ∈ RN++ and Ωt−1 =
(
ωνt−1
)
ν∈Nt ∈ RN+ . In every t, each
agent ν ∈ Nt is therefore completely identified by a duplet
(
lνt−1, ω
ν
t−1
) ∈ R2+ .
An agent ν ∈ Nt endowed with
(
lνt−1, ω
ν
t−1
)
can engage in three types of pro-
duction activity: she can sell her labour power zνt ; she can hire others to
operate a technique (At, Lt) ∈ Pt at the level yνt ; or she can work on her own
to operate (At, Lt) ∈ Pt at the level xνt .
Following Roemer [13, 14], we assume that production takes time and
current choices are constrained by past events. To be precise, wages are paid
ex post and wt ∈ R+ denotes the nominal wage rate at the end of t, but every
agent must be able to lay out in advance the operating costs for the activities
she chooses to operate using her wealth W νt−1. Letting pt ∈ R+ denote the
price of the produced commodity at the end of t and beginning of t+ 1, the
market value of agent ν’s endowment - her wealth - is W νt−1 = pt−1ω
ν
t−1. The
1Given our focus on the dynamics of exploitation and class, the one-good assumption
yields no loss of generality. The model can be extended to include n commodities, albeit
at the cost of a significant increase in technicalities and computational intensity.
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wealth that is not used for production activities can be invested to purchase
goods to sell at the end of the period, δνt .
Our main behavioural assumption postulates that agents wish to accu-
mulate as much as possible, subject to consuming bt ∈ R++ per unit of
labour performed, Λνt ≡ Lxνt + zνt . Within every period t, we consider bt
as a constant parameter, but we do allow for the possibility that bt changes
endogenously over time.
This modelling choice is motivated by our focus on the dynamics of ex-
ploitation and class in capitalist economies characterised by a drive to accu-
mulate, rather than on consumer choices. Theoretically, it is also consistent
with the classical-Marxian tradition where consumption is largely the prod-
uct of social norms, rather than utility-maximising behaviour, and it allows
us to analyse the issue of the persistence of class and exploitation abstract-
ing from heterogeneous individual consumption behaviour. Unlike in many
accumulation models in the Marxian tradition, however, the introduction
of an (endogenously determined) subsistence bundle raises some interesting
theoretical and technical issues, as it imposes a relevant and oft-neglected
constraint on the set of equilibria.
3 The basic model
In this section, we set up and analyse the basic model, which is characterised
by constant population, technology, preferences, consumption norms, and
labour endowments over time. The focus on the basic model is motivated by
analytical clarity and because it provides a theoretical benchmark and start-
ing point for our analysis. However, the framework, concepts, and definitions
presented in this section, and in the next one, can be easily extended and
the results derived continue to hold in more general economies (as confirmed
also by the simulations).
Let Nt = N , Pt = P = {(A,L)}, bt = b, and
(
lνt−1
)
ν∈N = (l
ν )ν∈N for
all t, and suppose that the economy is sufficiently productive to produce a
surplus: 1 − vb > 0, where v = L(1 − A)−1 denotes the embodied labour
value.2 In every t, given (pt, wt), every agent ν ∈ N chooses xνt , yνt , zνt ,
and δνt to maximise her wealth subject to purchasing b per unit of labour
performed (1) and to the constraints set by her capital (2) and labour (3)
2The condition 1 − vb > 0 is equivalent to (1− bL) > A: it implies that if Ax units
of capital are invested in the production process, (1− bL)x > Ax units of output (net of
necessary consumption) are produced.
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endowments. Formally, every ν solves the following programme MP νt :
max
(xνt ; y
ν
t ; z
ν
t ;δ
ν
t )
ptω
ν
t
subject to
ptx
ν
t + [pt − wtL] yνt + wtzνt + ptδνt = ptbΛνt + ptωνt (1)
pt−1Axνt + pt−1Ay
ν
t + pt−1δ
ν
t = pt−1ω
ν
t−1, (2)
Lxνt + z
ν
t 5 lν , (3)
xνt , y
ν
t , z
ν
t , δ
ν
t , ω
ν
t = 0. (4)
Let Aν (pt, wt) be the set of actions ξνt ≡ (xνt ; yνt ; zνt ; δνt ) that solve MP νt
at prices (pt, wt). Let V
ν
t
(
pt−1ωνt−1; (pt, wt)
) ≡ max ptωνt be the value of
MP νt realised by the actions in Aν (pt, wt). Let (p, w) ≡ {(pt, wt)}t=1,... and
let (xν ; yν ; zν ; δν ) ≡ ξν = {ξνt }t=1,.... A basic accumulation economy is
defined by the set of agents, N , technology, (A,L), consumption bundle, b,
labour endowments, Π, and initial capital endowments, Ω0; and is denoted as
E(N ; (A,L) ; b; Π,Ω0), or, as a shorthand notation, E0. Let xt ≡
∑
ν∈N x
ν
t ,
and likewise for yt, zt, δt, ωt, Λt, and l. Based on Roemer [14], the equilibrium
notion can be defined.
Definition 1: A reproducible solution (RS) for E(N ; (A,L) ; b; Π,Ω0) is a
vector (p, w) and associated actions (ξν )ν∈N , such that at all t:
(a) ξνt ∈ Aν (pt, wt), for all ν ∈ N (individual optimality);
(b) A(xt + yt) + δt 5 ωt−1 (capital market);
(c) Lyt = zt (labour market);
(d) (xt + yt) + δt = bΛt + ωt (goods market).
At a RS, in every period (a) all agents optimise; (b) aggregate capital is
sufficient for production plans; (c) the labour market clears; (d) aggregate
supply is sufficient for consumption and accumulation plans. The economy
E(N ; (A,L) ; b; Π,Ω0) can thus be interpreted either as a sequence of gener-
ations living for one period or as an infinitely-lived economy analysed in a
sequence of temporary equilibria.
For any (p, w), the profit rate at t is pit =
pt−pt−1A−wtL
pt−1A
. Given the struc-
ture of the economy, we shall focus on equilibria with strictly positive prices.3
3It immediately follows from MP νt that if there is some t
′ such that pt′ = 0, then at
any RS it must be pt = 0 for all t > t
′.
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Hence the profit rate is well defined at all t, and we can take the produced
commodity as the nume´raire, setting pt = 1, all t. Let the normalised price
vector be denoted as (1, ŵ), where 1 = (1, 1, ...) and, at any t, ŵt is the real
wage rate. It is immediate to prove that at any RS, if ωt−1 > 0, then ŵt = b
and pit = 0, all t.
Given the previous observations, by constraints (1)-(2), it follows that at
any RS, for all ν ∈ N and all t, the following equation must hold
ωνt = [1− A− ŵtL] (xνt + yνt ) + (ŵt − b) (Lxνt + zνt ) + ωνt−1. (5)
Equation (5) has a number of implications. Lemma 1 proves that if the
profit rate is strictly positive, then all wealth is used productively and if the
wage rate is above subsistence, then the labour constraint (3) binds, for all
agents at the solution to MP νt .
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Lemma 1: Let (1, ŵ) be a RS for E0. At any t: if pit > 0, then A (x
ν
t + y
ν
t ) =
ωνt−1, all ν ∈ N ; and if ŵt > b, then Lxνt + zνt = lν , all ν ∈ N .
Proof: By equation (5), if pit > 0, but A (x
ν
t + y
ν
t ) < ω
ν
t−1, some ν ∈ N ,
then ν can increase yνt and capital accumulation, contradicting optimality.
Similarly, if ŵt > b and Lx
ν
t + z
ν
t < l
ν , ν ∈ N , then ν can increase zνt and
capital accumulation, contradicting optimality.
Next, it is possible to derive an explicit expression for the value of MP νt
and for the growth rate of capital, gν
t
, for all agents.
Lemma 2: Let (1, ŵ) be a RS for E0. Then V
ν
t
(
ωνt−1; (1, ŵt)
)
= (1 + pit)ω
ν
t−1+
(ŵt − b) lν , and gνt = pit + (ŵt − b) l
ν
ωνt−1
, for all ν ∈ N .
Proof: Straightforward from equation (5).
Lemma 2 has some interesting implications concerning the dynamics of
accumulation. Let pimax ≡ 1−A−bL
A
. Firstly, at all t, the aggregate growth
rate of the economy is gt = pit + (ŵt − b) lωt−1 . Hence, if l = LA−1ωt−1, then
gt = pi
max, and if ŵt = b, then g
ν
t
= gt = pi
max, for all ν ∈ N such that
ωνt−1 > 0. Secondly, if ŵt > b, then for any ν, µ ∈ N , gνt > gµt if and only
if l
ν
ωνt−1
> l
µ
ωµt−1
. Finally, if pit = 0 then g
ν
t
= (1−vb)
v
lν
ωνt−1
, for all ν ∈ N such
that ωνt−1 > 0, and gt =
(1−vb)
v
l
ωt−1
. Therefore, if there exists t′ = 1 such that
4To be precise, a RS should be denoted as
(
(1, ŵ) , (xν ; yν ; zν ; δν )ν∈N
)
. In what
follows, we simply write (1, ŵ) for the sake of notational simplicity.
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pit = 0 for all t = t′, then the growth rate of the basic economy decreases
over time and tends asymptotically to zero.
Lemma 3 derives a useful property of the set of solutions of MP νt .
Lemma 3: Let (1, ŵ) be a given price vector such that pit = 0 and ŵt =
b, some t. If ξνt solves MP
ν
t , then ξ
′ν
t ∈ R4+ also solves MP νt whenever
x′νt + y
′ν
t = x
ν
t + y
ν
t and z
′ν
t − Ly′νt = zνt − Lyνt .
Proof: It is easy to check that ξ′νt satisfies constraints (1)-(2). Moreover,
labour performed is the same in ξνt and ξ
′ν
t , since L (x
′ν
t + y
′ν
t )+(z
′ν
t − Ly′νt ) =
L (xνt + y
ν
t ) + (z
ν
t − Lyνt ). Then the result follows from equation (5).
Lemma 3 implies that if (xνt ; y
ν
t ; z
ν
t ; δ
ν
t ) solves MP
ν
t , then there is an-
other vector (0; y′νt ; z
′ν
t ; δ
ν
t ) which solves MP
ν
t . In the simulations, this
allows us to select one of the many potential solutions of MP νt by setting
xνt = 0 for all ν ∈ N .
Theorem 1 characterises the equilibria of the economy.
Theorem 1: Let
(
(1, ŵ) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E0. At any t:
(i) If pit > 0 and ŵt > b, then l = LA
−1ωt−1. Furthermore, for any (1, ŵ′t)
such that pi′t = 0 and ŵ′t = b, (ξνt )ν∈N also satisfies conditions (a)-(d) of
Definition 1;
(ii) If l > LA−1ωt−1 > 0 then ŵt = b;
(iii) If l < LA−1ωt−1 then pit = 0.
Proof: Part (i). By Lemma 1, A (xνt + y
ν
t ) = ω
ν
t−1 and Lx
ν
t + z
ν
t = l
ν , for all
ν ∈ N . Therefore, A (xt + yt) = ωt−1 and, by Definition 1(c), L (xt + yt) =
Lxt+zt = l. Since (xt + yt) = A
−1ωt−1, we have L (xt + yt) = LA−1ωt−1 = l.
To prove the second part of the statement, take any (1, ŵ′t) such that pi
′
t = 0
and ŵ′t = b. Then, it is immediate to show that ξνt solves MP νt at (1, ŵ′t) for
all ν and (ξνt )ν∈N satisfies conditions (b)-(d) of Definition 1 by assumption.
Part (ii). At any RS, it must be ŵt = b. Suppose, contrary to the
statement, that ŵt > b. Then, for all ν ∈ N , by (2), A (xνt + yνt ) 5 ωνt−1
and by Lemma 1, Lxνt + z
ν
t = l
ν . But, since l > LA−1ωt−1, Lyt < zt holds,
contradicting Definition 1(c). Therefore ŵt = b.
Part (iii). At any RS, it must be pit = 0. Suppose, contrary to the
statement, that pit > 0. Then, for all ν ∈ N , by (3), Lxνt + zνt 5 lν and
by Lemma 1, A (xνt + y
ν
t ) = ω
ν
t−1. But, since l < LA
−1ωt−1, Lyt > zt holds,
contradicting Definition 1(c). Therefore pit = 0.
9
Theorem 1 defines the theoretical framework for the analysis of the dy-
namics of the economy and provides the foundations for the parameterisa-
tions of the price vector (1, ŵ). Although it only identifies necessary condi-
tions for the existence of a RS, it does shed some light on how to construct the
dynamic general equilibria of the economy. Consider part (ii) of the proof.
Suppose l > LA−1ωt−1, some t. If ŵt = b, then pit > 0 and labour performed
does not produce any net income for accumulation, and for all ν ∈ N , any
(0; yνt ; z
ν
t ; 0) with Ay
ν
t = ω
ν
t−1 solves MP
ν
t . Therefore since Ayt = ωt−1 and
l > LA−1ωt−1, we can choose a suitable profile (zνt )ν∈N such that Lyt = zt
and all conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied at t.
Consider part (iii) of the proof. Suppose l < LA−1ωt−1, some t. If pit = 0,
then ŵt > b and capital holders are indifferent between using their wealth
productively and just carrying it for sale at the end of the period, and for
all ν ∈ N , any (0; yνt ; zνt ; δνt ) with zνt = lν solves MP νt . Therefore since
zt = l and l < LA
−1ωt−1, we can choose a suitable profile (yνt )ν∈N such that
Lyt = zt and all conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied at t.
4 Exploitation and Class in the Accumula-
tion Economy
The concept of exploitation in the accumulation economy can now be intro-
duced. In what follows, exploitation status is defined in every period t: this is
a natural assumption if the model describes a series of one-period economies,
otherwise it reflects a focus on within period exploitation.5
Unlike in subsistence economies, focusing on the bundle consumed by an
agent may be misleading as both poor and rich agents consume b per unit of
labour expended, but their potential consumption is very different. Definition
2 identifies exploitation status in terms of the bundles of goods that an agent
can purchase with her income. More precisely, for all ν ∈ N and all (pt, wt),
let cνt satisfy ptc
ν
t = V
ν
t
(
W νt−1; (pt, wt)
)
+ ptbΛ
ν
t − ptωνt−1. Then
Definition 2 [Roemer [14]]: Agent ν is exploited at t if and only if Λνt > vc
ν
t ;
she is an exploiter if and only if Λνt < vc
ν
t ; and she is neither exploited nor
an exploiter if and only if Λνt = vc
ν
t .
Theorem 2 characterises the exploitation status of every agent, based on
their wealth per unit of labour performed
W νt−1
Λνt
:
5For a discussion of within period and whole life exploitation, see Veneziani [17, 18].
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Theorem 2: Let (1, ŵ) be a RS for E0. At any t, if pit > 0:
(i) agent ν is an exploiter ⇔ W νt−1
Λνt
> 1
pit
[1−ŵtv]
v
;
(ii) agent ν is exploited ⇔ W νt−1
Λνt
< 1
pit
[1−ŵtv]
v
;
(iii) agent ν is neither exploited nor an exploiter ⇔ W νt−1
Λνt
= 1
pit
[1−ŵtv]
v
.
Proof: By Lemma 2, V νt
(
W νt−1; (1, ŵt)
)
= (1 + pit)W
ν
t−1 + (ŵt − b) lν , which
in turn implies that cνt = pitW
ν
t−1 + (ŵt − b) lν + bΛνt , for all t and all ν ∈ N .
Therefore for any ŵt = b, using Lemma 1, cνt = pitW νt−1+ŵtΛνt , for all t and all
ν ∈ N . But then agent ν is an exploiter if and only if v (pitW νt−1 + ŵtΛνt ) >
Λνt , and the first part of the statement follows from simple algebraic manip-
ulations. The other two parts follow in like manner.
Theorem 2 generalises analogous results by Roemer [14], as it charac-
terises the exploitation status of all agents also in economies with unem-
ployed labour. If ŵt > b, then Lemma 1 implies that Λ
ν
t = l
ν , all ν ∈ N ,
and so by Theorem 2 exploitation status is determined by the ratio of cap-
ital and labour endowments as in Roemer [14]. However, by Theorem 1, if
l > LA−1ωt−1, then ŵt = b holds and Definition 1(c) implies that Λνt < l
ν
for at least some ν ∈ N . In this case, the economy is characterised by un-
employed labour, and exploitation status is determined by the ratio of the
capital endowment and labour performed,
W νt−1
Λνt
.
Observe that Theorem 2 holds if pit > 0. If pit = 0 then ŵt = (1/v) > b
and Λνt = vc
ν
t for all ν ∈ N and no exploitation exists in the economy.
This correspondence between profits and exploitation is a standard result in
Marxian theory (for a discussion, see Veneziani and Yoshihara [19]).
Following Roemer [14], classes can be defined based on the way in which
agents relate to the means of production.6 In every t, for any ξνt ∈ Aν (pt, wt),
consider only the first three entries of ξνt , and let (a1, a2, a3) be a vector
where ai ∈ {+, 0}, i = 1, 2, 3, where “+” means a positive entry. Agent ν
is said to be a member of class (a1, a2, a3), if there is ξ
ν
t ∈ Aν (pt, wt) such
that (xνt ; y
ν
t ; z
ν
t ) has the form (a1, a2, a3). The notation (+,+, 0) implies, for
instance, that an agent works in her own ‘shop’ and hires others to work
for her; (+, 0,+) implies that an agent works both in her own ‘shop’ and
for others; and so on. Although there are eight conceivable classes, only the
following four are theoretically relevant.
6Again, observe that we focus on within period classes (see Veneziani [17, 18]).
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C1t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (pt, wt) has a solution of the form (+,+, 0) \ (+, 0, 0)} ,
C2t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (pt, wt) has a solution of the form (+, 0, 0)} ,
C3t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (pt, wt) has a solution of the form (+, 0,+) \ (+, 0, 0)} ,
C4t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (pt, wt) has a solution of the form (0, 0,+)} .
The notation (a1, a2, a3)\ (a′1, a′2, a′3) means that agent ν is a member of class
(a1, a2, a3) but not of class (a
′
1, a
′
2, a
′
3).
To see that C1t − C4t represent a partition of the set of agents, note first
that classes (0,+, 0) and (0, 0, 0) can be ignored without loss of generality:
at a RS with ŵt > b both classes are empty by Lemma 1, while if ŵt = b
(and so pit > 0) then agents in (0,+, 0) and (0, 0, 0) also belong to (0,+,+)
and (0, 0,+), respectively.
Theorem 3 characterises the class structure of the accumulating economy.
Theorem 3: Let (1, ŵ) be a RS for E0. At any t, if pit > 0:
(i) ν ∈ (+,+, 0)\(+, 0, 0) ⇔ Lyνt > zνt for all ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) ;
(ii) ν ∈ (+, 0, 0) ⇔ Lyνt = zνt for some ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) ;
(iii) ν ∈ (+, 0,+)\(+, 0, 0) ⇔ Lyνt < zνt for all ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) ;
(iv) ν ∈ (0, 0,+) ⇔ W νt−1 = 0.
Proof: 1. If pit > 0, then by Lemma 1, for all ν ∈ N , A (xνt + yνt ) = ωνt−1
for all ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt). Therefore ν ∈ (0, 0,+) implies W νt−1 = 0. Conversely,
it is easy to see that for all ŵt = b, if W νt−1 = 0, then ν ∈ (0, 0,+).
2. Consider agents with W νt−1 > 0. By the convexity of MP
ν
t , if Ly
ν
t > z
ν
t
for some ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) and Ly′νt < z′νt for some ξ′νt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt), then there
is ξ′′νt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) such that Ly′′νt = z′′νt . Therefore, for all agents with
W νt−1 > 0: either Ly
ν
t > z
ν
t for all ξ
ν
t ∈ Aν (1, ŵt); or Lyνt < zνt for all
ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt); or Lyνt = zνt for some ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt). The latter are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases.
3. Part (i). Suppose Lyνt > z
ν
t for all ξ
ν
t ∈ Aν (1, ŵt). We consider two
cases.
Case 1 : ŵt > b. By Lemma 1, at all ξ
ν
t ∈ Aν (1, ŵt), it must be
A (xνt + y
ν
t ) = ω
ν
t−1 and Lx
ν
t +z
ν
t = l
ν . From the first equation it follows that
Lxνt + Ly
ν
t = LA
−1ωνt−1 and so we have LA
−1ωνt−1 − Lyνt = lν − zνt . Since
Lyνt > z
ν
t for all ξ
ν
t ∈ Aν (1, ŵt), then LA−1ωνt−1 > lν .
Consider ξ′νt = (x
′ν
t ; y
′ν
t ; 0; 0) such that Lx
′ν
t = l
ν , and x′νt + y
′ν
t = x
ν
t + y
ν
t .
Note that y′νt = A
−1ωνt−1−L−1lν > 0 and so noting that z′νt −Ly′νt = zνt −Lyνt ,
by Lemma 3 it follows that ξ′νt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt). Hence, ν ∈ (+,+, 0).
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It remains to show that ν /∈ (+, 0, 0). Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that there is ξνt = (x
ν
t ; 0; 0; 0) ∈ Aν (1, ŵt). Since pit > 0, then by Lemma 1,
Axνt = ω
ν
t−1 and so Lx
ν
t = LA
−1ωνt−1 > l
ν , a contradiction.
Case 2 : ŵt = b. In this case, any ξ
ν
t such that δ
ν
t = 0, A (x
ν
t + y
ν
t ) = ω
ν
t−1,
and Lxνt + z
ν
t 5 lν , solves MP νt . Therefore, it is immediate to see that
ν ∈ (+,+, 0). Further, ξνt =
(
0;A−1ωνt−1; l
ν ; 0
) ∈ Aν (1, ŵt), and therefore
Lyνt > z
ν
t for all ξ
ν
t ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) implies LA−1ωνt−1 > lν . Hence the same
argument as in Case 1 can be used to prove ν /∈ (+, 0, 0).
4. Parts (ii) and (iii) are proved similarly.
Theorem 3 provides a complete partition of the set of agents into classes,
based on the way in which agents relate to the means of production. An
immediate implication of Theorem 3 is that the class status of each agent is
related to her productive endowments.
Corollary 1: Let (1, ŵ) be a RS for E0. Consider any t, such that pit > 0.
Then, ν ∈ C1t ⇔ LA−1ωνt−1 > lν and ν ∈ C4t ⇔ W νt−1 = 0. Furthermore,
if ŵt > b, then ν ∈ C2t ⇔ LA−1ωνt−1 = lν and ν ∈ C3t ⇔ LA−1ωνt−1 < lν ;
whereas if ŵt = b, then ν ∈ C2t ⇔ LA−1ωνt−1 5 lν and C3t = ∅.
A fundamental insight of Marxian exploitation theory is the existence
of a tight relation between class positions and exploitation status. This is
formalised in the next principle.7
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP) [Roemer [14]]:
Given any economy E0, at any RS and any t, if pit > 0:
(A) every member of C1t is an exploiter.
(B) every member of C3t ∪ C4t such that Λνt > 0 is exploited.
The next result proves that the CECP holds in the accumulation economies
considered in this paper.
Theorem 4 (CECP): Let (1, ŵ) be a RS for E0. At any t, such that pit > 0,
if ν ∈ C1t then ν is an exploiter and if ν ∈ C3t ∪ C4t then ν is exploited.
Furthermore, if ŵt > b then:
ν ∈ C1t ⇔ ν is an exploiter;
ν ∈ C2t ⇔ ν is neither exploited nor an exploiter;
ν ∈ C3t ∪ C4t ⇔ ν is exploited.
7In part (B), we impose the condition that agents in the lower classes spend some of
their time working. This is a theoretically appropriate restriction since the exploitation
status of agents who do not engage in any economic activities is unclear.
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Proof: 1. If ŵt > b, then the result follows immediately from Corollary 1
and Theorem 2, noting that by Lemma 1, Λνt = l
ν and 1
pit
[1−ŵtv]
v
= A
L
.
2. Suppose that ŵt = b. By Corollary 1, ν ∈ C3t ∪ C4t ⇔ W νt−1 = 0.
Hence by Theorem 2, if Λνt > 0, then ν is exploited. Further, by Corollary
1, ν ∈ C1t ⇔ LA−1ωνt−1 > lν . Noting that W
ν
t−1
Λνt
= W
ν
t−1
lν
> A
L
= 1
pit
[1−ŵtv]
v
, the
result follows from Theorem 2.
Theorem 4 confirms the standard Marxist insight that agents in the upper
classes are exploiters and agents in the lower classes are exploited.
5 An index of exploitation
The relation between class and exploitation status derived in the previous
section provides some interesting normative insights on the structural in-
justices characterising capitalist economies, as Roemer [14] has forcefully
argued. Yet, an exclusive focus on classes and on the sets of exploiters and
exploited agents, as well as on the CECP, yields a rather partial, coarse pic-
ture of the structure of exploitative relations: two economies with similar
numbers of agents belonging to each class and each exploitation category
may still be very different. Based on Definition 2, it is possible to extend the
normative reach of the concept of exploitation and provide a finer and more
comprehensive picture of exploitative relations.
A first important characteristic of Definition 2 is that it allows us to
move beyond a purely aggregate analysis and explore the exploitation status
of every agent. This immediately raises the issue of the measurement of the
intensity of exploitation, both at the individual and at the aggregate level. It
is certainly desirable to have a notion of exploitation that allows us to make
statements such as “agent A is less exploited than agent B”, or “Economy C is
more exploitative than economy D”, or “Economy E is becoming increasingly
exploitative over time”.
Definition 2 states that exploitation status is determined according to
whether Λνt ≷ vcνt . Therefore a natural index of the intensity of exploitation
of any agent ν ∈ Nt in period t is:
eνt =
Λνt
vcνt
,
where eνt ∈ [0,∞), and eνt can be interpreted as the rate of labour sup-
plied relative to the labour necessary to obtain one unit of consumption.
From this perspective, exploitative relations are equivalent to inequalities in
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labour hours supplied to earn one unit of income (measured in the labour
nume´raire) and the notion of exploitation is normatively relevant in that
eνt can be interpreted as a well-being index capturing access to some fun-
damental primary goods, namely economic resources (or commodities) and
free hours. The profile (eνt )ν∈Nt then measures the distribution of access to
resources and free hours and so of opportunity for well-being.
Agent ν is exploited if and only if eνt > 1, but, assuming e
ν
t to be a
meaningful cardinal and interpersonally comparable measure, a much richer
analysis of exploitative relations is possible. For example, one can say that
the greater eνt the more exploited ν is and, for any ν,µ ∈ Nt, if eνt > eµt > 1
then ν is more exploited than µ. And similarly for exploiters. More gener-
ally, we can analyse the distribution of eνt in the economy at a given point
in time, as well as its evolution over time, and ask questions about the ex-
ploitation structure of the economy. A more polarised distribution of eνt , for
instance, suggests an increase in the intensity of exploitation. Interestingly,
the mathematical structure of the profile (eνt )ν∈Nt is similar to that of income
or wealth distributions, and so the measurement of some aggregate degree
of exploitation raises similar issues as in the debate on the measurement of
income or wealth inequalities. Below, we provide a complete description of
the (dynamics of the) distribution of eνt . We also trace the evolution of the
associated Gini index, interpreted as one example of a summary measure of
the aggregate intensity of exploitation.
6 The dynamics of the basic model
This section analyses the basic model computationally. The aim is to illus-
trate the relevance of the theoretical results derived above and to rigorously
describe the dynamics of exploitation and class - including the distribution
of the exploitation intensity variable - in the benchmark case. This section
also provides the basic formal and computational framework for the analysis
of more complex economies below.
The simulation begins with data on (N ; (A,L) ; b; Π,Ω0). The benchmark
set of parameters is: N = 100, A = 0.5, L = 0.25, b = 1.9, and lν =
1, for all ν ∈ N . As concerns productive assets, aggregate initial capital
is ω0 = 25. This guarantees that l > LA
−1ω0 holds and the economy is
initially capital constrained, starting far from the knife-edge condition l =
LA−1ωt−1. This is important in order to examine the existence and evolution
of exploitation, profits and classes over time: by Theorem 1, the knife-edge
condition identifies a ceiling to capital accumulation as it provides an upper
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bound to the aggregate amount of capital compatible with the existence of
positive profits and exploitation.
The distribution of aggregate capital is determined in order to mimic the
empirical wealth distribution in the U.S. economy as reported by Allegretto
[1]. In all of our simulations, ω0 is distributed such that there are five groups
of agents. The first group comprises 50-70% of the total population and each
ν in this group is assigned ων0 = 0.
8 The top 1% of agents are assigned 40% of
ω0, the next 4% are assigned 30% of ω0, the next 15% are assigned 20%, and
the remaining 10% of ω0 is distributed to whatever agents remain (minimum
10% and maximum 30% of N).
This parameterisation represents our benchmark in all simulations, unless
otherwise stated.9 It is worth stressing at the outset that the values chosen
are empirically reasonable, but - as shown in section 9 below - our key insights
are robust to different choices of the initial values of the key parameters.
Concerning agents, by Lemma 3, we restrict the computational analysis
to solutions of MP νt for all ν and t of the form (0; y
ν
t ; z
ν
t ; δ
ν
t ). To be specific, at
any t, we set ξνt =
(
0;A−1ωνt−1;
LA−1ωt−1
l
lν ; 0
)
, ξνt =
(
0; l
LA−1ωt−1
A−1ωνt−1; l
ν ;(
1− l
LA−1ωt−1
)
ωνt−1
)
, or ξνt =
(
0;A−1ωνt−1; l
ν ; 0
)
, for all ν, depending on
whether the economy is capital constrained, labour constrained, or on the
knife-edge. In all of our simulations, this specification of agents’ optimal
choices guarantees that the conditions in Definition 1 are always satisfied.10
The simulation runs for T = 50 periods. The simulation first checks
whether the economy is capital constrained, labour constrained, or on the
knife-edge and updates ŵt accordingly. Given the choice of ω0, the simulation
begins with ŵ1 = b. Once ŵt is determined, pit is known and the agents then
solve MP νt . The agent’s endowments are updated according to equation (5)
and the simulation then repeats as necessary.11
The results of the simulation over T can be found in Figures 1-3. Figure
1 reports the aggregate activity levels (xt, yt, zt, δt), aggregate net output
(1− A) yt, net output per capita (1− A) yt/N , wealth Wt−1, the growth rate
of capital gt, ŵt and b, and pit. In all panels, the dashed vertical line denotes
8The actual number of agents assigned to this first group is randomly drawn from a
uniform distribution.
9The procedure to determine the initial wealth distribution is the same in all versions
of the model. While the initial distributions will inevitably differ across models due to
different starting points in relation to the knife-edge and to the randomness built into
the procedure, the differences are sufficiently small that the results of the simulations are
unaffected and can be compared across models.
10See Section A.1 of the Appendix.
11All simulations are done using Mathematica version 10.
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the period in which the economy becomes labour constrained.
Figure 2(a) reports the dynamics of exploitation by providing a headcount
of the agents who are exploiters, exploited, or neither according to Definition
2. Clearly, the exploitation status of agents is constant while the economy is
capital constrained and exploitation ceases to exist once it becomes labour
constrained.
Figure 2(b) captures the class composition of the economy. The pattern
of C1t and C
2
t is interesting and it reveals the relation between endowments
and class status: at the beginning of the simulation, a relatively low level
of capital implies that for a number of agents labour demand (Lyνt ) is lower
than their labour endowment (lν), placing them into C2t . As accumulation
progresses, however, so does their labour demand and these agents eventually
join C1t .
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Figure 2(c) illustrates Theorem 4 and shows the existence of robust corre-
spondence between class and exploitation status (until the economy becomes
labour constrained).
Figure 3 provides a complete description of the distribution of the ex-
ploitation intensity index, eνt , over the course of the simulation. Prior to the
economy becoming labour constrained, the distribution of eνt is constant over
time: there is no tendency for exploitation to diminish. When the economy
becomes labour constrained, profits and exploitation disappear, and one can
observe that eνt = 1, all ν ∈ N . Interestingly, agents in the lower classes
are exploited to somewhat different degrees. All agents in C4t are exploited
with equal intensity, since they all have zero endowments and work the same
amount. The exploitation status of agents in C2t is not obvious instead: some
of them are indeed exploited (albeit less than members of C4t ) but agents at
the upper end of C2t are exploiters (albeit less than members of C
1
t ).
Figure 3 displays a relatively low dispersion of the exploitation index.
This is due to the fact that, unlike in actual economies, all agents perform
the same amount of labour and, in the capital constrained phase, the given
parameterisation (in particular the rather high value of b) yields a low profit
rate. Different values of the parameters, or a heterogeneous allocation of
labour (perhaps inversely proportional to wealth, in order to reflect class
differences) lead to a much higher dispersion (see section 9 below).13
In summary, the results of the basic model confirm that exploitation and
12In Figure 2(b), and in all similar figures below, the class composition of the economy
is shown only for the periods t with pit > 0. For if the profit rate vanishes Theorem 3 and
Corollary 1 no longer apply, and the definition of classes needs to be revised.
13The Gini coefficient of (eνt )v∈N is constant and equal to 0.0281395 until the economy
becomes labour constrained, when it drops to zero.
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Figure 1: Summary results - Basic model
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Figure 2: Class and exploitation status - Basic model
(a) Exploitation status (b) Class status
(c) CECP
classes are meaningful concepts to analyse the economic and social structure
of capitalist economies, and the distribution of exploitation intensity index
yields interesting normative insights. They also confirm, however, that in an
accumulation economy, absent any countervailing forces, exploitation disap-
pears over time. Our next step, therefore, is to extend the basic model in
order to explore possible mechanisms that could lead to the persistence of
exploitation in the presence of accumulation.
In all of the following extensions, we introduce technical change as a key
mechanism for maintaining labour abundant relative to capital. Technical
change plays a prominent role in Marxian theory and it has been central
in debates on the persistence of exploitation (e.g. Skillman [15]). But we
consider two different models to determine the key distributive variables,
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Figure 3: Exploitation intensity index - Basic model
namely wages and profits. In the next section, we explore the interplay of
technical change and the evolution of social norms, whereas in section 8 we
set up a general bargaining model.
7 Endogenising consumption and technical change
In this section we extend the basic model to allow both the consumption
bundle, bt, and the production technology, (At, Lt) to be determined endoge-
nously and change over time, and analyse their effect on the dynamics of
exploitation and classes. This choice reflects both empirical and theoreti-
cal concerns. Empirically, the long-run evolution of capitalist economies has
indeed been characterised by an increase in (average) consumption oppor-
tunities and by a tendential expansion of technical knowledge, leading to a
progressive increase in labour productivity (see Flaschel et al. [7]).
Theoretically, a fundamental feature of capitalism as a dynamic system is
its constant tendency to revolutionise production. It is certainly restrictive
to assume the production technology (A,L) to remain constant over time,
and regardless of changes in prices and distribution. Labour-saving tech-
nical progress may also play a crucial role in the dynamics of exploitation
by guaranteeing the persistent abundance of labour. Further, although sub-
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jective consumption choices are not central in the Marxian analysis of class
and exploitation, it is restrictive (and unrealistic) to assume that consump-
tion norms remain constant over time with the subsistence wage at some
biologically-determined level.
To be specific, concerning consumption, we incorporate some Marxian in-
sights on the social nature of consumption and assume that bt is the product
of social norms, by making it a function of the general level of development
of the economy, as proxied by aggregate capital, and of the history of con-
sumption itself. Formally,
bt = f1(bt−1, ωt−2, ωt−1).
With the specification used in the simulation as follows:
bt = bt−1 ·
(
1 + φ
ωt−1 − ωt−2
ωt−2
)
, (6)
where the parameter φ captures the degree to which the degree of develop-
ment of the economy influences consumption norms.
Concerning technology, we follow Marx and assume that when the profit
rate falls beneath a certain threshold, capitalists increase their efforts to
innovate and introduce new capital-using labour-saving techniques. Formally,
(At, Lt) = f2(ŵt;At−1, Lt−1),
where f2 is defined as follows
(At, Lt) = (At−1, Lt−1) , if pi(ŵt;At−1,Lt−1) =
1− At−1 − ŵtLt−1
At−1
= pi∗,
(At, Lt) = (A
′, L′) , if pi(ŵt;At−1,Lt−1) =
1− At−1 − ŵtLt−1
At−1
< pi∗,
where pi∗ is the capitalist’s minimum profitability benchmark, which will
depend on economic, institutional and even cultural factors. The new tech-
nique (A′, L′) is chosen such that A′ = At−1, L′ < Lt−1, and pi′ = 1−A
′−ŵtL′
A′ >
pi(ŵt;At−1,Lt−1). In the simulations, we assume that capitalists decide whether
to introduce new techniques as soon as they know bt and the real wage ŵt -
and thus pi(ŵt;At−1,Lt−1). This is both theoretically and empirically reasonable,
but it is worth stressing that - as argued in section 9 below - the main results
are robust to alternative assumptions on the timing of innovations.
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7.1 Simulation results
In our simulations, we set pi∗ = 0.01. When pi(ŵt;At−1,Lt−1) < pi∗, the new
technique prevailing at t is identified by first selecting a profit rate, pi′, from
the set of all previous profit rates {piτ}τ<t, such that piτ > pi∗ and then
randomly choosing an increase in At−1 in the range [0.01, 0.03] and setting
Lt =
1−At−Atpi′
ŵt
. To ensure that At < 1 a limit is set such that Amax = 0.991.
In the event that the pseudo-randomly determined pi′ and At entail a negative
Lt, pi
′ is adjusted downward by 0.02 so that Lt > 0.
The simulation occurs in the following order: (1) initialisation, t = 1;
(2) subsistence bt is updated; (3) ŵt and pi
(ŵt;At−1,Lt−1) are determined;14 (4)
given pi(ŵt;At−1,Lt−1), At and Lt are updated if appropriate, leading pit to be
subsequently updated to reflect the new technology; (5) agents solve MP νt ;
and (6) the sequence (2)-(5) is repeated for T .
The simulation runs for T = 50, with A0 = 0.5, L0 = 1, b0 = 0.3,
φ = 1, lνt = 1 for all ν ∈ Nt and all t, and Nt = 100, all t. The initial
distribution of endowments Ω0 is chosen as in the basic model, with aggregate
initial endowments ω0 = 15, so that l > L1A
−1
1 ω0 and the model is capital
constrained at the start of the simulation.
The main results of the model are depicted in Figures 4-7(b). Figure 4 re-
ports the same information as Figure 1 for the basic model. Some differences
between Figures 1 and 4 clearly emerge, notably concerning the dynamics of
net output, wealth, and labour performed. While net output and wealth grow
over the course of the simulation (as driven by yt), zt exhibits a cyclical down-
ward trend. This is caused by the decreasing trend of Lt together with its
cyclical movements driven by the periods of accumulation and rising labour
demand occurring between (labour-saving) technological changes. Through-
out the cycles of accumulation and technical change the economy remains
capital constrained. Therefore there is a secular increase in ŵt = bt from
b0 = 0.3 to bmax = 92.6886, and, as expected, pit exhibits cyclical behaviour
in the range of its initial value pi0 = 0.4 and a minimum of pimin = 0.0100257
(see Figure 4). Figure 5 shows the dynamics of At, Lt, and labour values.
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The interaction among consumption behaviour, social norms and capital-
ist innovations leads to a very interesting dynamic behaviour. As predicted,
technical change allows exploitation and classes to persist. The intuition
14The determination of the wage rate and profit rate depends on whether the economy
is capital constrained, labour constrained, or on the knife-edge. If the economy is capital
constrained we set ŵt = bt.
15The condition vtbt < 1 holds throughout the simulation even as (vt, bt) change over
T .
22
Figure 4: Summary results - Model with endogenous subsistence and tech-
nical change
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Figure 5: Technology and labour values - Model with endogenous subsistence
and technical change
is the following. Since the economy is initially capital constrained, then
ŵt = bt for at least some periods t, t ≥ 1. As accumulation proceeds, the
subsistence norm, bt, increases and so does the real wage rate in equilib-
rium. Therefore the profit rate starts declining before the economy becomes
labour constrained. But as the profit rate goes beneath pi∗, an innovation is
introduced which restores profitability, and so on. It is noteworthy that a
strongly cyclical behaviour is generated in an essentially linear economy: it
is the interaction of technical change and capitalist behaviour that generates
persistent growth cycles.
Figures 6(a)-6(b) show the remarkable persistence and stability of the
basic exploitation and class structure of the economy produced by the intro-
duction of technical change.16 Figure 6(c) confirms that the CECP continues
to hold in the more general economy considered here.
Figures 6(a)-6(c) focus on the basic exploitation and class structure of
the economy, as in the standard Marxian approach, and thus draw a partial
picture of exploitative relations. To see this, consider Figures 7(a)-7(b) which
provide information about the distribution of the exploitation intensity in-
16The “bumps” in the number of agents in C1t and C
2
t in Figure 6(b) are due to decreases
in Lt yielding Lty
ν
t ≤ lν for some ν who were previously members of C1t .
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Figure 6: Class and exploitation status - Model with endogenous subsistence
and technical change
(a) Exploitation status (b) Class status
(c) CECP
dex eνt . Under the surface of a seemingly unchanging pattern of exploitation,
Figures 7(a)-7(b) show that the addition of technical change induces an in-
teresting phenomenon of “exploitation cycles”. As accumulation progresses
with a given technique (At, Lt), exploitation tends to decrease as e
ν
t tends to
1 for all ν. However, when a new technique is introduced, profitability and
inequality in exploitation intensity are restored, driving a wedge between the
lower and upper classes, and the pattern of accumulation and exploitation
resumes until another production technique is introduced.
The results support the claim that capital-using labour-saving technical
change can help to explain the persistence of exploitation in accumulation
economies (Skillman [15]). The key role of technical change in this context is
25
Figure 7: Exploitation intensity index - Model with endogenous subsistence
and technical change
(a) Exploitation intensity across agents (b) Gini coefficient of eνt
to make capital persistently scarce relative to labour and to maintain labour
unemployment throughout. This is certainly an important insight but it is
worth stressing that it derives from a rather specific mechanism to deter-
mine distributive variables: technical change plays a crucial role in creating
labour unemployment which in turn forces the real wage down to the (so-
cially determined and time-evolving) subsistence level. This immediately
raises two issues. First, it appears that labour unemployment is a neces-
sary determinant of the persistence of exploitative relations. Yet it would
be important, both normatively and theoretically, to analyse exploitation
and class in economies with full employment. Nothing in Marx’s theory of
exploitation and class depends on the existence of unemployment and full
employment does not make capitalist economies non-exploitative. Second,
given the extremely skewed asset distribution, the assumption of a perfectly
competitive labour market seems rather unrealistic. With the richest 5% of
the population holding around 70% of the wealth and employing a mass
of propertyless agents (around 50-70% of the population), and the issues of
power and class solidarity that this polarised wealth distribution raises, it
seems natural to analyse a more complex model for the determination of the
key distributive variables.
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In the next section, we extend our analysis to explore the interplay of
accumulation and technical change in more general economies with full em-
ployment, generalised Nash bargaining, and population growth.
8 Endogenous technical change with collec-
tive bargaining on wages and profits
In this section, we analyse exploitation and class in capitalist economies
with technical change and population growth, by focusing on dynamic paths
characterised by the full employment of labour. The key point to note is
that whenever the economy is at the knife-edge, with LtA
−1
t ωt−1 = lt, the
equilibrium distribution is generally indeterminate. This allows us to explore
the effects of bargaining on exploitation and class.
8.1 The bargaining model
Consider any period t such that LtA
−1
t ωt−1 = lt. For given technology and
population, we assume that income distribution is determined by collective
bargaining at the beginning of t, before the production process starts. To be
specific, given pt = 1, the bargaining game S (At, Lt) is defined as
17
S (At, Lt) ≡ ∪ŵt∈[b, 1vt ]
{
(sν)ν∈Nt | sν 5 V νt
(
ωνt−1; (1, ŵt)
)
(∀ν ∈ Nt)
}
,
where V νt
(
ωνt−1; (1, ŵt)
)
= (1 + pit)ω
ν
t−1 + (ŵt − b) lνt , all ν ∈ Nt, and so the
set of Pareto-optimal payoffs is completely identified by varying ŵt. Let
σt ≡ (σνt )ν∈Nt ∈ RNt+ with
∑
ν∈Nt σ
ν
t = 1 denote a profile of weights capturing
the agents’ bargaining power. The Nash bargaining solution N (σt) (S (At, Lt))
is:
N (σt) (S (At, Lt)) = arg max
ŵt∈
[
b, 1
vt
]∏ν∈Nt [V νt (ωνt−1; (1, ŵt))]σνt .
There are many conceivable ways of capturing agents’ bargaining power.
Different specifications yield different dynamics of income distributions and
exploitative relations. In what follows, we consider a large set of possibilities
by specifying the bargaining power of each agent ν ∈ Nt as follows:
σνt ≡ (1− )
ωνt−1
ωt−1
+ 
Nνt
Nt
, some  ∈ [0, 1] , (7)
17In this section, we focus on the bargaining procedure and assume again a constant b.
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where Nνt ≥ 1 is the number of agents who possess the same wealth as ν.
Formally, N νt ≡ #
{
ν ′ ∈ Nt | ων′t−1 = ωνt−1
}
.
Equation (7) incorporates some important insights of Marxian theory.
For it states that the bargaining power of each agent ν ∈ Nt depends partly
on the ownership of means of production (more precisely, on their share of
aggregate capital) and partly on the number of agents who share the same
objective condition as ν (in terms of capital ownership). Thus, bargaining
power derives either from economic resources, or from the ability of agents
in a similar condition to act collectively.
Equation (7) is very general. The variable  allows us to capture the
polar cases of economies with weak solidarity and low levels of organisation
( ≈ 0), and economies in which the power of capital and economic resources
is mitigated by collective action ( ≈ 1), as well as any intermediate scenarios.
If  = 0, then the bargaining power of each agent is proportional to her
share of aggregate capital: capitalists have all the bargaining power while
propertyless agents have no influence at all on the determination of wages
and profits. In contrast, if  = 1, then - given a very skewed distribution of
wealth - the richer segments of the population have virtually no bargaining
power: propertyless agents constitute the majority of population and play
the main role in determining bargaining outcomes.
Let ŵN
(σt)
t ∈ N (σt) (S (At, Lt)): in period t, every agent ν ∈ Nt solves
MP νt given the price vector
(
1, ŵN
(σt)
t
)
, and given ((At, Lt) , b). Because
LtA
−1
t ωt−1 = lt, it is immediate to show that conditions (a)-(d) of Definition
1 are satisfied.
At the end of the period, both technological knowledge and population
are updated. Concerning the former, let piN
(σt)
t =
1−At−ŵN(σt)t Lt
At
be the profit
rate resulting from the bargaining process. As in section 7, if piN
(σt)
t < pi
∗,
then capitalists redouble their efforts to find new profitable techniques. We
assume that in this case a new technique is generated with probability λ 5 1,
such that At+1 = gAt and Lt+1 = gLt, for some g < 1. The new technique is
obviously cost reducing and therefore is universally adopted in period t+ 1.
Concerning population, we assume that economic growth drives popula-
tion growth - for example, by determining population flows in or out of the
economy, or as part of a general Malthusian mechanism. Formally, in each
t, if the economy is at a knife-edge equilibrium, then population in period
t+ 1, lt+1, will be
lt+1 =
[
(1− bLt)A−1t
]
lt,
where
[
(1− bLt)A−1t
]
corresponds to the growth rate of capital at t and
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can be interpreted, in a classical-Marxian fashion, as the natural rate of
population growth. For it is reasonable to assume that in a situation of full
utilisation of capital and labour, the growth rate of population is adjusted
to be equal to the rate of capital accumulation.18
The combined effect of our assumptions on technical change and popu-
lation growth is that if the economy is at a full employment equilibrium in
period t, there will be neither excess capital nor excess labour in t + 1. To
be sure, both assumptions can be deemed somewhat artificial: they should
be interpreted as a schematic representation (due to the linear structure of
the model and the peculiarity of the knife-edge condition) of a self-correcting
mechanism, or as part of a balanced growth path.
8.2 Simulation Results
The simulation begins with the same N0 = 100 and the same distribution
of wealth as in all previous models, and with initial values of A0 = 0.9,
L0 = 1, and b = 0.08. For the technical change routine the threshold profit
rate is pi∗ = 0.03 and the likelihood of discovering a new technique when
appropriate is λ = 1. When technical change takes place, the value of g is
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution from 0.9 to 0.96. As concerns
the bargaining parameter  in equation (7), below we consider three different
scenarios, namely the two polar cases with capitalist dominance ( = 0) and
class solidarity ( = 1), and the intermediate case with  ∈ (0, 1) .
The simulation occurs in the following order: (1) determine (σνt )ν∈Nt ; (2)
determine ŵ
N(σνt )
t and pit through Nash bargaining; (3) agents solve MP
ν
t ; (4)
population lt+1 is determined to balance the knife-edge condition;
19 (5) At+1
and Lt+1 are updated if appropriate; (6) steps (2)-(5) are repeated for T .
18In a more general setting allowing for unemployment of labour or capital, one could
assume that if the economy is capital constrained at t, then lt+1 <
[
(1− bLt)A−1t
]
lt;
while if the economy is labour constrained then lt+1 >
[
(1− bLt)A−1t
]
lt. This is because
if the economy is capital constrained and labour is abundant then the wage rate is at the
subsistence level and, in the Malthusian law of population, labour supply grows slowly,
while if the economy is labour constrained and capital is abundant, profits are zero and
the real wage is very high, inducing a high growth rate of the population.
19In order to ensure that lt = LtA
−1
t ωt−1 holds for all t, Nt is determined by rounding
LtA
−1
t ωt−1 up to the nearest integer. Therefore ωt−1 is also adjusted upward to maintain
the knife-edge. Any additional capital is added to the endowment of the wealthiest agent
in order to avoid random changes in the behaviour of the simulation. Any new agents
enter the simulation with ωνt−1 = 0. This is reasonable as a first approximation, or if one
interprets population growth mainly as the product of migration flows.
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8.2.1 Capitalist dominance
Consider first the case where economic resources, and specifically ownership
of the means of production, are the key determinant of bargaining power
and  = 0 in equation (7). Figure 8 reports the summary results of the
aggregate activity levels (yt, xt, zt, δt), net output (1− At)yt, net output per
capita (1 − At)yt/Nt, wealth Wt−1, the growth rate of capital gt, and the
distributive variables
(
ŵ
N(σνt )
t , pit
)
. Two features immediately stand out.
First, the combination of population growth and wage bargaining leads to
rapid accumulation. Even over a relatively short length of time T = 50,
population grows from 100 agents to 32,485. Second, the bargaining power
of capitalists is such as to guarantee that the profit rate remains positive and
at a rather high level, while ŵ
N(σνt )
t = b for all t, even though the economy
never becomes capital constrained. Figure 9 displays At, Lt, and vt.
Figures 10-11(b) show the exploitation and class status of agents.20 They
show a distinct, remarkable pattern of increasing polarisation in the economy.
As time goes by, an ever increasing proportion of the agents are exploited by
an ever decreasing minority of exploiters. The fraction of agents in the lower
classes constantly rises while that of agents in the upper classes falls.
One interesting result from this simulation is that the Gini coefficient
of eνt decreases over time. This is not because exploitation is disappearing
from the economy, it is an artifact of the way in which Gini coefficients
are constructed. The ever-increasing number of agents with ωνt−1 = 0 leads
to the vast majority of agents having identical, high values of eνt , which
leads the Gini of eνt to decrease as shown in Figure 11(a). Given the clear
pattern of increasing polarisation emerging from Figure 10, this suggests that
perhaps the Gini coefficient is not the best index of the aggregate degree of
exploitation, and it raises the issue of the appropriate aggregate measure of
exploitative relations.21
20Unlike in previous models, given the rapidly changing population over time, in this
section the charts reporting class and exploitation status show the percentage of the pop-
ulation at all t belonging to a given class or exploitation classification.
21The polarisation of the economy also shows up if one considers the distributions of
wealth and income (taking income as the gross revenue of agents as determined by the
left-hand side of constraint (1) in MP νt ), whose Gini coefficients monotonically increase
over time, tending to a value above 0.9 in the long run. See section A.4 of the Appendix.
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Figure 8: Summary results - Bargaining model with  = 0
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Figure 9: Technology and labour values - Bargaining model with  = 0
8.2.2 Class solidarity
Consider next the case where bargaining power is determined solely by class
solidarity and  = 1 in equation (7). The results are presented in Figures
12 and 13. The economy displays a rather fast pace of accumulation as in
the model with capitalist dominance. Given the numerical preponderance
of the agents with ωνt−1 = 0, however, the power of class solidarity in wage
bargaining favours propertyless agents who set a value of ŵ
N(σνt )
t leading to
pit = 0 for all t ≥ 1. In other words, working class solidarity eliminates
exploitation from the very beginning and the benefits of accumulation (and
productivity increases) are distributed in the form of increased wages. The
figures reporting exploitation status, class status, and the CECP are not
shown as they do not convey much information. The Gini of the exploitation
intensity index is obviously equal to zero throughout the simulation.22
22The Gini coefficients of wealth and income display an interesting behaviour over time
and provide a rather different picture of the economy, compared to the Gini coefficient
of (eνt )ν∈Nt . The Gini coefficient of wealth initially decreases, reflecting the reduction in
inequalities due to the zero profit rate and the accumulation of wealth by all agents (since
ŵt > b all t). This trend is then reversed as growth accelerates and the number of new,
propertyless agents added to economy in each t grows closer to (and eventually surpasses)
the number of existing agents with a positive (and possibly quite large) amount of wealth
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Figure 10: Class and exploitation status - Bargaining model with  = 0
(a) Exploitation status (b) Class status
(c) CECP
8.2.3 Mixed scenarios
In this section, we consider economies in which  ∈ (0, 1) and the bargaining
power of agents derives both from the ownership of the means of production
and from class solidarity and collective action. The fundamental, and rather
striking result of the computational analysis is that class solidarity plays a
dominant role in the bargaining process and tends to drive the dynamics of
the economy. For instance, for any  ≥ 0.5, the economy behaves in a manner
accumulated over time. In contrast, the Gini coefficient of income (defined as the agents’
gross revenue) exhibits a persistent downward trend during the simulation. This is due
to the fact that by construction the wage income of all agents is the same and the zero
profit rate implies that asset inequalities only partly translate into income inequalities.
(See section A.4 of the Appendix.)
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Figure 11: Information on eνt - Bargaining model with  = 0
(a) Gini coefficient of eνt
(b) Distribution of eνt for select t (relative frequency)
qualitatively similar to the model with  = 1: the bargaining process leads
to a value of ŵ
N(σνt )
t such that pit = 0 for all t.
Only very small values of  - in the range of 0.001 to 0.005 - allow for
behaviour along the knife-edge at which pit > 0 and ŵ
N(σνt )
t > b, but only for a
small number of periods. For  ∈ [0.001, 0.005], the economy displays a very
interesting cyclical behaviour: the bargaining power of propertyless agents
drives profits initially to zero but, once technical change occurs, the profit
rate starts to increase, and accumulation with it. However, as population
also grows, the number of new (propertyless) agents added in every t is large
and their class solidarity begins to outweigh the power of relatively wealthy
agents. This leads the profit rate to decrease and even though - when pit falls
below pi∗ - other technical innovations are introduced, they only allow for a
short-lived recovery of profitability. The economy then enters a phase during
which profits and exploitation disappear for any remaining t.
Below, we show the results of the simulation for  = 0.002. Figure 14
reports the summary results of the aggregate activity levels (yt, xt, zt, δt),
net output (1 − At)yt, net output per capita (1 − At)yt/Nt, wealth Wt−1,
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Figure 12: Summary results - Bargaining model with  = 1
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Figure 13: Technology and labour values - Bargaining model with  = 1
the growth rate of capital gt, and the distributive variables
(
ŵ
N(σνt )
t , pit
)
.
As in the previous cases, the combination of population growth and wage
bargaining leads to rapid accumulation. Even over a short length of time
T = 20, the population grows from 100 agents to 8,556. The bottom right
panel captures the cycle in the profit rate described above, where pit = 0 for
all t ≥ 15. Figure 15 displays At, Lt, and vt.23
Figures 16(a)-16(c) show the exploitation and class status of agents. Fig-
ure 16(a) captures the lack of exploitation at the start of the simulation,
its reemergence for a period of time, and its eventual disappearance. Fig-
ure 16(b) reports the dynamics of classes, which is richer than in previous
models. Observe that, whenever the real wage is above the subsistence level,
all agents in C4t accumulate and join C
2
t+1, and are fully replaced in C
4
t+1
by the newly arrived agents with ωνt = 0. Hence, the economy shows some
upward mobility. As accumulation progresses, wage bargaining mediates the
movement of some agents between C1t and C
2
t , but the continued expansion
of C4t and the faster pace of accumulation induce a downward trend in the
size of C2t and an upward trend in that of C
1
t . The continual growth of C
4
t
(despite upward social mobility) reflects the arrival of an increasingly larger
number of propertyless agents. Figure 16(c) captures the short period of
23The condition vtbt < 1 holds throughout the simulation.
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Figure 14: Summary results - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
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Figure 15: Technology and labour values - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
time for which capitalists are able to convert their ownership of the means of
production into economic advantage and the CECP applies, after which the
correspondence between class and exploitation status breaks down.
Figures 17(a) shows the Gini coefficient for eνt , which mirrors the cycle
in the profit rate with exploitation intensity eventually converging to one for
all agents once pit = 0. Snapshots of the distribution of e
ν
t for select t are
provided in Figure 17(b) to show the progression of exploitation intensity to
uniformity as accumulation progresses.24
In closing this section, some interesting features of the economies with
bargaining are worth noting. A comparison of the dynamic paths of the
three models suggests that the class solidarity regime is best and the cap-
italist dominance regime is worst in terms of several indicators, including
growth rates, capital accumulation, labour productivity, and per capita con-
sumption.25 Of course, this may depend on the exact specification of our
24The interaction between varying distributional patterns and the changing composition
of the population over time leads to patterns of the Gini coefficients for wealth and income
(defined as gross revenue) that are on the whole qualitatively similar to those of the model
with class solidarity. (See section A.4 of the Appendix.) The basic intuition is the same
as explained in footnote 22.
25Even population growth is lowest in the capitalist dominance regime and highest in
38
Figure 16: Class and exploitation status - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
(a) Exploitation status (b) Class status
(c) CECP
model, including the assumptions guaranteeing that the economy remains
along the knife-edge path. Yet, this insight is fundamentally consistent with
the fact that capitalist economies with strong concentration of power in the
hands of capitalists tend to settle on dynamic paths with high profit rates
and low growth rates (at least relative to their potential), as forcefully shown
by Piketty [12]. Indeed, in terms of our model, the trajectory of advanced
capitalist economies in the last forty years (the neo-liberal era) might be ex-
plained as the product of a shift from a kind of mixed regime with a strong
working class to a capitalist dominance regime.
the class solidarity regime, thus suggesting that the latter would be the most flourishing
society.
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Figure 17: Information on eνt - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
(a) Gini coefficient of eνt
(b) Distribution of eνt for select t (relative frequency)
9 Robustness
We have analysed many variations of our models in order to assess the robust-
ness of our results. In this section, we briefly summarise the main points.26
First, we have considered alternative specifications of the initial values of
the key parameters of all models. Different values of the initial population,
N0, technology, (A0, L0), consumption bundle, b0, and aggregate capital, ω0,
make hardly any difference to our conclusions.27 Different distributions of
the initial aggregate capital, ω0, also have no impact on the results, provided
capital is unequally distributed and there are some propertyless agents.
Changes in these parameters may affect the quantitative features of the
economies (e.g., the size of the various classes, the period in which the econ-
omy becomes labour constrained, and so on) but the qualitative patterns of
26Results are available from the authors upon request.
27Subject, obviously, to the economy remaining capital constrained or on the knife edge,
depending on the model.
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class and exploitation status, as well as the basic summary results, remain
essentially unchanged. It is worth noting, however, that different values of
the initial parameters yield different distributions of eνt . For example, a sim-
ulation of the basic economy with the same population and asset distribution
as in section 3, and (A = 0.5, L = 0.25, b = 0.5) yields a distribution of eνt in
the range [0.03306, 4] with a Gini coefficient of 0.26568 - quite close to the
Gini coefficient of income in actual capitalist economies.
Second, we have analysed the robustness of the main results on class struc-
ture and on the relation between exploitation and class status by adopting
an alternative definition of classes. Corollary 1 proves that class status is
determined for each agent by the difference between actual labour demand
and potential labour supply - i.e., the agent’s labour endowment. Yet one
may argue that class status should be determined based on agents’ actual
position in the labour market, and so on their actual labour supply. All of
our main insights continue to hold if this alternative approach is adopted.28
Third, the results of the model with technical change and growth in con-
sumption in section 7 are also strongly robust to alternative specifications of
the functions f1 and f2, including different values of the dampening param-
eter φ and of the reference profit rate pi∗, as well as to different assumptions
on the properties of new techniques. Among other tests, we have analysed an
alternative specification of the model in which the new technique (A′, L′) is
chosen by first randomly selecting a change in At from a uniform distribution
between 0.03 and 0.05. Then the new value of Lt is determined by setting
vtbt = v1b1 + h, where bt is given by equation (6) and h is a random real
number in the interval [−0.25, 0.25].29 To ensure that At < 1 for all t there
is a maximum value set at Amax = 0.991: once Amax is reached, technical
change continues as Harrod-neutral (constant Amax and decreasing Lt when
pit < pi
∗) to ensure that 1 > vtbt. An interesting property of this model is that
- unlike in section 7 - innovations do not automatically restore profitability.
The results obtained are strikingly similar to those presented in section 7.30
We have also tested alternative assumptions on the timing of technical
change by supposing that the decision to implement technical change is taken
based on realised rather than anticipated profit rates. Formally, this implies
assuming that, when pit < pi
∗, innovations occur after production takes place.
The main insights in section 7 remain valid with classes and exploitation be-
having in a qualitatively similar way. Technical change does yield persistent
28See Section A.3 of the Appendix.
29These assumption ensure that the condition, 1 > vtbt, is never violated.
30See Section A.2 of the Appendix.
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exploitation and profits on the whole, but since it occurs ex post the profit
rate is not necessarily strictly positive in every period.
Fourth, section 8 already reports the results for a large set of values of the
bargaining parameter . But the key insights are robust to changes in various
other features of the model. For example, the main results remain essentially
unchanged if we relax the assumption that the likelihood of discovering a new
technique when appropriate is exactly equal to one, or if we allow technical
change to take place at a faster pace by increasing the range of g. Perhaps
more interestingly, in equation (7), instead of defining N νt as the number of
agents who possess exactly the same amount of wealth as ν, one may adopt
a broader categorisation and define N νt as the number of agents with wealth
within a certain interval,31 or who belong to the same class as ν.32 These
alternative specifications do not change the results significantly given the
rather unequal wealth distribution, and given our specification of population
growth. For in all of these scenarios the bargaining power of the poorest
segments of the working class remains unchanged, and it increases over time
as more propertyless agents appear in the economy.
10 Conclusions
This paper analyses the equilibrium dynamics of exploitation and class in
general accumulation economies with population growth, technical change,
and bargaining by adopting a novel computational approach. Two sets of
results emerge from the analysis. First, in capitalist economies characterised
by a drive to accumulate, labour-saving technical change plays a key role in
guaranteeing the persistence of exploitation and class by making labour per-
sistently abundant relative to capital. Nonetheless, and perhaps strikingly,
in competitive economies characterised by full employment and bargaining
over distribution, labour-saving technical change and population growth are
not sufficient to generate persistent class and exploitative relations even if
the economy never becomes labour constrained. The model forcefully high-
lights the importance of power, and specifically bargaining power, as one of
the possible determinants of the persistence of classes and exploitation. It is
only when economic resources, and specifically the ownership of the means of
production, give a significant advantage in distributive conflict - compared to
31Formally, in any t, let ωmaxt = maxν∈Nt ω
ν
t and let {α0, ..., αn} be a set of real numbers
such that α0 = 0, αn = 1, and αi−1 < αi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then let I0 = 0 and Ii =
(αi−1ωmaxt , αiω
max
t ] for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If ωνt ∈ Ii, i ≥ 0, then Nνt ≡ # {ν′ ∈ Nt | ν′ ∈ Ii}.
32Formally, if ν ∈ Cit , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, Nνt ≡ #
{
ν′ ∈ Nt | ν′ ∈ Cit
}
.
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class solidarity among propertyless agents - that exploitative relations persist
over time as an equilibrium feature of capitalist economies.
Second, far from being metaphysical, the concept of exploitation provides
the foundations for a logically coherent and empirically relevant analysis of
inequalities and class relations in advanced capitalist economies. An index
that identifies the exploitation level, or intensity of each individual can be
defined and its empirical distribution studied using the standard tools of the
theory of inequality measurement. In our analysis, we have focused on the
Gini coefficient for illustrative purposes as it is one of the most widely used
indices of dispersion, but - as our simulations show - the Gini coefficient does
not necessarily convey clear normative information about the distribution of
the exploitation index. An interesting open question concerns precisely the
appropriate aggregate index of the intensity of exploitation.33
It would be interesting to extend our analysis to economies with n goods,
more general technologies, and even more complex bargaining procedures. A
particularly intriguing question, for example, concerns the relation between
power and technical change, and their joint relevance for class and exploita-
tion. For the use of economic resources in distributive conflict is only one
dimension of capitalist power. Control over the means of production implies
that capitalists can also determine - at least to some extent - the direction and
nature of technical change. In line with the recent literature on power-biased
technical change (e.g., Guy and Skott [9, 10]), one could analyse innovations
that allow capitalists - either directly or indirectly via changes in the struc-
ture of production - to alter power relations, for example, by affecting class
solidarity and increasing the relative weight of economic resources, .34
Another important question concerns the implications of heterogeneity in
labour skills and in individual consumption/leisure trade-offs. On the one
hand, as already noted, the assumption that agents have the same skills and
preferences, and perform the same amount of labour leads to less extreme
inequalities in exploitation intensity than are observed in empirical income
or wealth distributions. We interpret our results as identifying a lower bound
to the intensity of exploitative relations, and as such we think that the dis-
tributions obtained in our models are quite remarkable. But it would be
interesting to analyse the distributions emerging when this constraint is re-
laxed.
33The answer to this question depends on the normative insights that the notion ex-
ploitation as the unequal exchange of labour is meant to capture. We analyse this issue
in [22].
34Or, perhaps more subtly, using a divide-and-conquer strategy that changes the relevant
Nνt for propertyless workers.
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On the other hand, as is well known, the introduction of heterogeneous
labour poses major problems in the standard definition of labour embodied
vt. In this respect, it is important to stress that if the approach developed
in Veneziani and Yoshihara [19, 21] is adopted, then the definition of the
exploitation intensity index can be extended to economies with n goods,
general technologies, and heterogeneous labour, preferences and skills, and
exploitative relations can be analysed empirically based on available data.
Finally, it would be interesting to consider more sophisticated norms in
consumption behaviour, possibly introducing some (class-based) heterogene-
ity across agents. In our model, an increase in profits - and therefore exploita-
tion - tends to raise the rate of accumulation. As already noted, however,
Piketty [12] has shown that advanced capitalist economies are witnessing
increases in profits (and the profit share) and in inequalities with a compar-
atively low rate of growth. The computational results in section 8 suggest
that this may be the product of a structural change from a regime with a
strong working class to one of capitalist dominance. Yet observed changes in
consumption habits may also have played an important role. In particular, a
norm of conspicuous consumption for the richest segments of society would
imply that increases in profits are not necessarily translated into a higher rate
of accumulation. Within our computational framework, this phenomenon
could be captured by assuming individual, rather than average, consumption
to depend on wealth: bνt = f(ω
ν
t−1), with f increasing and possibly convex.
Although it does not provide answers to these questions, this paper pro-
vides a conceptual and analytical framework to tackle them.
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Appendix A
A.1 Equilibrium conditions
The Figures in this section show that, in all of our simulations, conditions
(b)-(d) of Definition 1 in the paper are satisfied, and so we are analysing the
equilibrium dynamics of the economies considered.
Figure 18: Equilibrium conditions - Basic model
Figure 19: Equilibrium conditions - Model with endogenous subsistence and
technical change
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Figure 20: Equilibrium conditions - Bargaining model with  = 0
Figure 21: Equilibrium conditions - Bargaining model with  = 1
Figure 22: Equilibrium conditions - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
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A.2 An alternative analysis of technical change
In this section, we analyse a variant of the model in section 7 of the paper
in which technical change is modelled in a slightly different way.
We assume that, as soon as capitalists realise that pi(ŵt;At−1,Lt−1) < pi∗, a
new technique (A′, L′) is chosen by first randomly selecting a change in At
from a uniform distribution between 0.03 and 0.05. Then the new value of
Lt is determined by setting vtbt = v1b1 + h, where bt is given by equation
(6) in the paper and h is a random real number in the interval [−0.25, 0.25].
This ensures that the condition 1 > vtbt is never violated and it helps new
techniques “restore profitability” without imposing it by fiat. To ensure that
At < 1 for all t there is a maximum value set at Amax = 0.991. Once Amax
is reached, technical change continues as Harrod-neutral (constant Amax and
decreasing Lt when pi
(ŵt;At−1,Lt−1) < pi∗) to ensure that 1 > vtbt, but this
phase is only run for a short time in order to focus on the Marx-biased phase
of technical change.
All parameters, initial conditions and the sequencing of the simulation
routine are identical to the model in section 7.1 of the paper, except for the
length of time T , which is set to 150.
The results of this model are strikingly similar to those reported in section
7.1 of the paper. Figure 23 shows the dynamics of the main variables of the
model. The period in which At = Amax = 0.991 is denoted by a vertical
dashed line. It is worth noting in passing that although zt and pit seem to
vanish in the long-run, neither actually reaches zero: the minimum values
of zt and pit are, respectively, 0.161723 and 0.00145133. Observe further
that Figure 23 displays growth cycles deriving from the interaction of capital
accumulation and technical change. The fluctuations become increasingly
violent and ultimately the economy settles on a course with very low net
output and labour supply due to the increases in productivity. Figure 24
shows the evolution of At, Lt, and vt.
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Figure 23: Summary results
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Figure 24: Technology and labour values
Figure 25(a) shows that the basic structure of exploitative relations is
identical to that in section 7.1. The class structure of the economy, instead is
slightly different: as shown in Figures 25(b) and 25(c), the number of agents
in the top classes decreases over time and eventually goes to zero. This
interesting result is the product of rapid technical change, which leads Lt to
decrease faster than capital accumulation, yielding a progressive decrease in
labour demand.
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Figure 25: Class and exploitation status
(a) Exploitation status (b) Class status
(c) CECP
Figures 26(a) and 26(b) depict similar “exploitation cycles” as in sec-
tion 7.1, which are induced by the interaction of accumulation and technical
change.
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Figure 26: Exploitation intensity index
(a) Exploitation intensity index across agents (b) Gini coefficient of eνt
A.3 An alternative representation of class
In the paper, we follow Roemer [14] and define the main classes as follows:
C1t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (pt, wt) has a solution of the form (+,+, 0) \ (+, 0, 0)} ,
C2t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (pt, wt) has a solution of the form (+, 0, 0)} ,
C3t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (pt, wt) has a solution of the form (+, 0,+) \ (+, 0, 0)} ,
C4t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (pt, wt) has a solution of the form (0, 0,+)} .
In Corollary 1, we prove that at all equilibria with pit > 0, the class status
of an agent is determined by the difference between labour demand and
potential labour supply, which coincides with the agent’s labour endowment.
Yet, one may argue that classes should be defined based on agents’ actual
choices, and in particular on their choices within labour relations. Therefore
in this section we analyse the class structure and the relation between class
and exploitation status in all of our models based on agent’s actual choices.
The results are remarkably similar to those obtained in the paper.
For the basic model:
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Figure 27: Class status (alternative definition) - Basic model
(a) Class status (b) CECP
For the model with endogenous subsistence and technical change:
Figure 28: Class status (alternative definition) - Model with endogenous
subsistence and technical change
(a) Class status (b) CECP
For the model with wage bargaining and ε = 0:
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Figure 29: Class status (alternative definition) - Bargaining model with  = 0
(a) Class status (b) CECP
For the model with wage bargaining and ε = 1:
Figure 30: Class status (alternative definition) - Bargaining model with  = 1
(a) Class status (b) CECP
For the model with wage bargaining and ε = 0.002:
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Figure 31: Class status (alternative definition) - Bargaining model with  =
0.002
(a) Class status (b) CECP
A.4 Gini coefficients of wealth and income
In section 8 of the paper, we refer to the behaviour of Gini coefficients for
wealth and income (defined as the gross revenue of each agent, corresponding
to the left hand side of constraint (1) ofMP νt ) over the course the simulations.
The Figures below depict the evolution of these Gini coefficients.
For the model with wage bargaining and  = 0:
Figure 32: Gini coefficients of wealth and income - Bargaining model with
 = 0
(a) Gini coefficient of ωt−1 (b) Gini coefficient of income
For the model with wage bargaining and  = 1:
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Figure 33: Gini coefficients of wealth and income - Bargaining model with
 = 1
(a) Gini coefficient of ωt−1 (b) Gini coefficient of income
For the model with wage bargaining and  = 0.002:
Figure 34: Gini coefficients of wealth and income - Bargaining model with
 = 0.002
(a) Gini coefficient of ωt−1 (b) Gini coefficient of income
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